By Bhikkhu An\u0101layo<\/p>\n
Key words<\/strong>: External Mindfulness; Prosocial Dimensions of Mindfulness;\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>;\u00a0sm\u1e5btyupasth\u0101na<\/em>; Subjective and Objective<\/p>\n The proposal to understand an external application of mindfulness to refer to being objective rather than subjective is not well supported by the relevant sources and fails to be directly applicable to actual meditation practice. The most commonly accepted understanding in Buddhist sources and contemporary research, which considers external mindfulness to refer to being aware of other persons, remains the most meaningful and applicable explanation. Adopting this understanding can open the door to new avenues in mindfulness research, proceeding from the widely-recognized internal dimensions of mindfulness, concerned with what happens within a practitioner, to giving more explicit room to the potential of the same mental quality in understanding and relating to others.<\/p>\n According to Buddhist sources, mindfulness can be cultivated internally and externally. The implications of an external application are of considerable interest, which has stimulated two recent publications that came out nearly simultaneously: An\u0101layo 2020b (published online 15 May 2020) and Lin (2019) which, in spite of its official date, was actually published in 2020 (the online publication was first announced on H-Buddhism on 20 May 2020). Following up some of the suggestions that have emerged in this way can help to ascertain the probable significance of cultivating mindfulness externally in early Buddhist meditation theory.<\/p>\n Acknowledging the fact that contemporary scholarship tends to be in general agreement that externally practiced mindfulness refers to other persons, Lin (2019, p. 350) argued in support of a different interpretation on the grounds that the grammar involved had so far not been understood correctly by traditional exegesis and modern scholars:<\/p>\n previous scholarship has not taken sufficient account of the fact that \u201cinternally\u201d (adhy\u0101tmika\u1e43\/ajjhatta\u1e43<\/em>) and \u201cexternally\u201d (bahirdh\u0101\/bahiddh\u0101<\/em>) in the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101nasutta<\/em>\u00a0are adverbs. Because they deal with these two terms as if they are adjectives qualifying the nouns for the four objects of contemplation, most of the commentaries and most modern studies alike focus on distinguishing what objects are internal and what are external.<\/p>\n This in itself interesting suggestion could be explored by surveying how the relevant P\u0101li instruction has been translated by previous scholarship. This would show if the prevalent understanding is indeed based on confusing an adverb with an adjective. As an example, the phrase that in P\u0101li discourses describes contemplation of the body can be taken up\u00a0<\/em>(the phrase in P\u0101li takes two forms; one is:\u00a0iti ajjhatta\u1e43 v\u0101 k\u0101ye k\u0101y\u0101nupass\u012b viharati, bahiddh\u0101 v\u0101 k\u0101ye k\u0101y\u0101nupass\u012b viharati, ajjhattabahiddh\u0101 v\u0101 k\u0101ye k\u0101y\u0101nupass\u012b viharati<\/em>, as found in DN 22 and MN 10. Another form presents the same distinction phrased as an injunction, as found in SN 47.3).<\/p>\n The question would be whether recognized translators and scholars have indeed rendered this as an adjective that qualifies the body by speaking of an \u201cexternal body,\u201d for example. Below are several renderings of the P\u0101li phrase in English and German, presented in the sequence of the time of their publication:<\/p>\n So does he, as to the body, continue to consider the body, either internally or externally, or both internally and externally (Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids 1910, p. 328).<\/p>\n So wacht er nach innen beim K\u00f6rper \u00fcber den K\u00f6rper, so wacht er nach au\u00dfen beim K\u00f6rper \u00fcber den K\u00f6rper, nach innen und au\u00dfen wacht er beim K\u00f6rper \u00fcber den K\u00f6rper\u00a0(Neuman 1912\/2004, p. 384).<\/p>\n Herein, monk, as regards your own self, in body contemplating body \u2026 or as regards externals \u2026 or, both as regards your own self and as regards externals (Woodward 1930\/1979, p. 121).<\/p>\n Thus he lives contemplating the body in the body internally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body externally, or he lives contemplating the body in the body internally and externally (Soma 1941\/1981, p. 2).<\/p>\n Thus he dwells\u00a0practising\u00a0body-contemplation on the body internally, or externally, or both internally and externally (Nyanaponika 1962, p. 118).<\/p>\n In this way, monks, he fares along contemplating the body in the body internally, or he fares along contemplating the body in the body externally, or he fares along contemplating the body in the body internally and externally (Horner 1967, p. 72).<\/p>\n So he abides contemplating body as body internally, contemplating body as body externally, contemplating body as body both internally and externally (Walshe 1987, p. 336).<\/p>\n Da wache, o M\u00f6nch, beim K\u00f6rper \u00fcber den K\u00f6rper \u2026 und zwar nach innen, nach au\u00dfen, nach innen und au\u00dfen\u00a0(Hecker 1992\/2003, p. 289).<\/p>\n In this way he abides contemplating the body as a body internally, or he abides contemplating the body as a body externally, or he abides contemplating the body as a body both internally and externally (\u00d1\u0101\u1e47amoli 1995\/2005, p. 146).<\/p>\n Here, bhikkhu, dwell contemplating the body in the body internally \u2026 dwell contemplating the body in the body externally \u2026 dwell contemplating the body in the body internally and externally (Bodhi 2000, p. 1629).<\/p>\n In this way he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally (Kuan 2008, p. 109).<\/p>\n The above survey gives the impression that, at least as far as modern scholars are concerned, the prevalent understanding of external mindfulness as referring to others does not appear to be attributable to a confusion of an adverb with an adjective.<\/p>\n Regarding the implication of mindfulness practice being done internally or externally, the basic proposal presented by Lin (2019, p. 354) is that \u201cto contemplate internally is to take the meditative object as pertaining to the subjective aspect of experience, and to contemplate externally is to take that object as pertaining to the objective aspect.\u201d This interpretation is meant to express one of several alternative explanations provided in a Sarv\u0101stiv\u0101da exegetical work, the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101\u00a0<\/em>(T 1545). The relevant explanation in this work concludes with the following statement:<\/p>\n That is, the bases of the mind and mental factors are called internal, their objects are called external.<\/p>\n (T XXVII 714a:\u00a0\u8b02\u5fc3\u5fc3\u6240\u6240\u4f9d\u540d\u5167,\u00a0\u6240\u7de3\u540d\u5916).<\/p>\n Lin (2019, p. 319) combined his translation of this passage with a personal gloss (which unfortunately is not marked as something that no longer translates the original text) that conveys the main import in this way: \u201cIn other words, if a\u00a0dharma<\/em>\u00a0is classified as belonging to one of the sense bases (\u0101yatana<\/em>), it is internal; if it is an object of the six senses, it is external.\u201d<\/p>\n Comparing his own gloss with the interpretation proposed by him, it is not entirely clear how far a distinction between the senses and their objects, as correctly presented in his gloss on the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>, can be adequately captured with the terms \u201csubjective\u201d and \u201cobjective\u201d aspects of experience. The problem is that in their general usage these two terms can convey the difference between being biased or attached (\u201csubjective\u201d) and not being biased or attached (\u201cobjective\u201d). Such a sense, however, would differ from the distinction proposed in the passage quoted from the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>.<\/p>\n Early Buddhist thought envisages the arising of biases and attachments in the form of craving and fetters in relation to both the senses and their objects. An example in case is a passage from the\u00a0Mah\u0101satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>which, although in itself clearly a later addition to the discourse, can be taken to illustrate this position. For the case of the eye and visible forms, the relevant part proceeds in this manner:<\/p>\n In the world the eye is of a pleasing nature and an agreeable nature; when arising, it is here that this craving arises; when establishing itself, it is here that it establishes itself \u2026 in the world forms are of a pleasing nature and an agreeable nature; when arising, it is here that this craving arises; when establishing itself, it is there that it establishes itself.<\/p>\n (DN 22:\u00a0cakkhu\u1e43 loke piyar\u016bpa\u1e43 s\u0101tar\u016bpa\u1e43, etth\u2019 es\u0101 ta\u1e47h\u0101 uppajjam\u0101n\u0101 uppajjati, ettha nivisam\u0101n\u0101 nivisati \u2026 r\u016bp\u0101 loke piyar\u016bpa\u1e43 s\u0101tar\u016bpa\u1e43, etth\u2019 es\u0101 ta\u1e47h\u0101 uppajjam\u0101n\u0101 uppajjati, ettha nivisam\u0101n\u0101 nivisati<\/em>).<\/p>\n Another example is the description of the contemplation of the six senses in the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta<\/em>\u00a0itself, a practice also found in its\u00a0Madhyama-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel. This practice is absent from another discourse parallel extant in the\u00a0Ekottarika-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>and for this reason appears to reflect a later stage in the textual evolution of the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta<\/em>. For the case of the eye, the first part of the respective instructions in the two\u00a0<\/em>versions that cover this practice proceeds as follows:<\/p>\n One knows the eye, one knows forms, and one knows the fetter that arises dependent on both.<\/p>\n (MN 10:\u00a0cakkhu\u00f1 ca paj\u0101n\u0101ti, r\u016bpe ca paj\u0101n\u0101ti, ya\u00f1 ca tad ubhaya\u1e43 pa\u1e6dicca uppajjati sa\u1e43yojana\u1e43 ta\u00f1 ca paj\u0101n\u0101ti<\/em>).<\/p>\n In dependence on the eye and forms, a fetter arises internally.<\/p>\n (M\u0100 98:\u00a0\u773c\u7de3\u8272\u751f\u5167\u7d50).<\/p>\n This shows that the senses and their objects can both lead to craving and to the arising of a fetter. It follows that both can occasion a reaction that is \u201csubjective,\u201d in the sense of being with attachment. In contrast, with the complete eradication of defilements, in the case of an arahant, neither the senses nor their objects can lead to craving, fetters, or attachments.<\/p>\n It follows that the interpretation proposed in the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>\u00a0could better be captured by simply distinguishing between the senses and their objects. In contrast, a distinction between what is subjective and what is objective remains ambiguous, as it can be interpreted in different ways.<\/p>\n Lin (2019, p. 351) explained his interpretation to imply that \u201cwhen contemplating the body externally, one should take the body as the object, and conduct one\u2019s observations (1) in accordance with the principle that the body is the object of experience, and (2) from a viewpoint that is not identified with the body.\u201d The second point made here shows that his distinction between what is subjective and what is objective goes beyond the interpretation proposed in the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>, as the difference between the senses and their objects is not about being identified with something in contrast to not being identified with it. The same departure from the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>\u2019s explanation can be seen in relation to the next two establishments of mindfulness (P\u0101li\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>,\u00a0<\/em>Sanskrit\u00a0sm\u1e5btyupasth\u0101na<\/em>, Chinese\u00a0\u5ff5\u8655, Tibetan\u00a0dran pa nye bar gzhag pa<\/em>), in relation to which Lin (2019, p. 352) explained his understanding in this way:<\/p>\n In light of the interpretation I have proposed, one can observe them from a point of view that is identified with\u00a0vedan\u0101<\/em>\u00a0or\u00a0citta<\/em>, which is to contemplate them internally; and then, one can observe them as the objects of experience, without identifying oneself as the feeler regarding\u00a0vedan\u0101<\/em>\u00a0or the perceiver regarding\u00a0citta<\/em>, which is to contemplate them externally.<\/p>\n This proposal differs from the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101\u00a0<\/em>passage presented as the source of this interpretation. The early discourses encourage an application of the characteristic of not self to the senses but also to their objects (SN 35.6 and S\u0100 195), which implies that the tendency to identify needs to be countered even with the objects of the senses (see also Lin 2019, p. 344). Elsewhere the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>\u00a0also reflects the position that not only the eye (to take the case of visual experience as an example) but also visible forms can be identified with as a self (T XXVII 994b). It follows that the problem of identification cannot be confined to the senses only.<\/p>\n Another problem with the proposed interpretation is that it risks turning the arousing of identification into a commendable practice. The\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its parallels recommend the internal mode of practice just as much as the external mode (the mode that combines the two is absent from the\u00a0Madhyama-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>version). The instructions cover each of these two (or three) modes of practice similarly and without evincing any particular evaluation. If internal means to be subjectively identified, it follows that the instructions to cultivate mindfulness internally encourage the practitioner to identify with the body, feeling tones, mental states, and dharmas.<\/p>\n Lin (2019, p. 355) argued that a way of practice following his interpretation \u201cwould be an effective way of teaching a practitioner how one habitually and arbitrarily takes certain phenomena as self and other phenomena as related to self.\u201d To become aware of such habitual and arbitrary tendencies just requires observing those that are already there. It does not necessitate intentionally arousing identification. In fact, it would be difficult to find a passage in the early discourses which recommends the intentional cultivation of identification with the objects of meditative experience. Although the idea of intentionally promoting identification (in order to then counter it) would probably find resonance in some strands of Buddhist modernism, it does involve a departure from the approach evident in the early texts.<\/p>\n Lin (2019, p. 355) also argued that \u201cthis understanding of the purpose of the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>\u00a0practice has already been proposed in the\u00a0Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>,\u201d followed by citing a passage that relates internal contemplation to views about a self and its external counterpart to views about appropriation as \u201cmine.\u201d Yet, this proposal in the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101\u00a0<\/em>rather confirms that both forms of practice should lead to diminishing identification, instead of the internal becoming a way of fostering identification by adopting a subjective perspective.<\/p>\n In sum, the proposed interpretation does not seem to yield a viable understanding, as it invests internal contemplation with a tendency to encourage attachment in the form of identification rather than to counter it. This is out of keeping with the overall thrust of mindfulness meditation as described in the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta<\/em>, which throughout is concerned with overcoming attachment.<\/p>\n The interpretation proposed originally in the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101\u00a0<\/em>passage in question is also problematic, as it is not readily applicable to all four\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>s. For example, contemplation of the anatomical parts or the elements, two exercises common to the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its parallels (An\u0101layo 2013), could hardly be distinguished into being undertaken first from the perspective of the senses and then from the viewpoint of their objects.<\/p>\n Although not providing an understanding of the distinction between what is internal and what is external that works for all four establishments of mindfulness, the interpretation proposed in the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101\u00a0<\/em>passage is of considerable relevance for developing a historical perspective on the question of external mindfulness. This significance emerges once such a historical perspective is brought to bear on the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>itself, considered in light of its parallels and of interpretations found in early Abhidharma works. Such comparison points to the apparent addition of contemplation of the sense spheres to the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and one of its two parallels. This apparent addition may well have provided a starting point for the devising of alternative interpretations regarding the significance of internal and external mindfulness (An\u0101layo 2020b).<\/p>\n Such an addition would in itself be entirely natural, given that the importance of mindfulness in relation to sense experience forms a recurrent topic in other discourses. Once such an addition is in place, the circumstance that this contemplation brings in the senses and their objects almost inevitably leads to an expansion of the notion of what is external. This expansion appears to have triggered the devising of alternative explanations, such as the one discussed above from the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>.<\/p>\n The arising and spread of alternative interpretations is in itself less surprising, given that the early discourses provide only a few specific indications regarding the significance of an internal and an external cultivation of the establishments of mindfulness. A discourse that does provide such an indication is the\u00a0Janavasabha-sutta\u00a0<\/em>(DN 18), which in agreement with its\u00a0D\u012brgha-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel (D\u0100 4) indicates that external refers to directing mindfulness to the body, feeling tones, mental states, and dharmas of other persons. Another parallel preserved as an individual translation (T 9), however, has no such indication (An\u0101layo 2013, p. 17\u201319 and 2020c, p. 89\u201391). Lin (2019, p. 341) takes this to imply that the explicit indication in the other two versions, according to which external mindfulness practice concerns others, \u201cis unlikely to belong to the early stratum of this text.\u201d<\/p>\n This is certainly a possibility to be taken into account. At the same time, however, it could also be noted that the individual translation is rather late, stemming from the tenth century, and the same passage also contains a late phrasing, which combines an apparent misunderstanding of the term\u00a0ek\u0101yana<\/em>\u00a0(Nattier 2007, p. 190) with references to\u00a0bodhi\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0saddharma<\/em>, resulting in \u201cthe awakening through the one vehicle of the right Dharma\u201d (T I 216a:\u00a0\u83e9\u63d0\u4e00\u4e58\u6b63\u6cd5). It seems quite possible that this passage in the individual translation could be reflecting later times, rather than testifying to a stage earlier than the other two versions.<\/p>\n Lin (2019, p. 340) also highlighted a difference between the formulation in the\u00a0Janavasabha-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its\u00a0D\u012brgha-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel, as these mention what is essentially the same interpretation in slightly different ways. However, the actual variations are fairly normal in oral literature and need not be considered as reflecting substantial differences.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, even if one were to consider the individual translation as a testimony to an earlier stage in textual development, the agreement between the\u00a0Janavasabha-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its\u00a0D\u012brgha-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel on explicitly defining external cultivation of the four establishments of mindfulness to involve others would still be substantially earlier than the time of the compilation of the *Mah\u0101vibh\u0101\u1e63\u0101<\/em>.<\/p>\n Another passage of relevance to the question of external mindfulness involves three establishments of mindfulness practiced by the Buddha himself. These occur in the\u00a0Sa\u1e37\u0101yatanavibha\u1e45ga-sutta<\/em>\u00a0(MN 137), its\u00a0Madhyama-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel (M\u0100 163), a quotation extant in Tibetan (Up 7015), as well as in a range of later texts (An\u0101layo 2011, p. 785\u2013787). As in the context of the present article it would become rather unwieldy to present a full translation of all parallel versions, suffice it for the present purpose to take up only the\u00a0Madhyama-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>version as exemplifying the basic idea (Lin 2019, p. 341, who takes up the P\u0101li version, noted that the discrepancies between the P\u0101li and Chinese version are of no further relevance to the present discussion).<\/p>\n The description given below from the\u00a0Madhyama-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>version concerns a situation in which the Buddha (referred to as the \u201cTath\u0101gata\u201d) is giving teachings to his disciples:<\/p>\n Suppose the Tath\u0101gata teaches the Dharma to his disciples with thoughts of sympathy and consideration, seeking their benefit and welfare, seeking their peace and happiness, with a mind full of benevolence and compassion, [telling them]: \u201cThis is for your welfare, this is for your happiness, this is for your welfare and happiness.\u201d<\/p>\n (M\u0100 163:\u00a0\u82e5\u5982\u4f86\u70ba\u5f1f\u5b50\u8aaa\u6cd5,\u00a0\u6190\u5ff5\u610d\u50b7,\u00a0\u6c42\u7fa9\u53ca\u9952\u76ca,\u00a0\u6c42\u5b89\u96b1\u5feb\u6a02,\u00a0\u767c\u6148\u60b2\u5fc3:\u00a0\u662f\u70ba\u9952\u76ca,\u00a0\u662f\u70ba\u5feb\u6a02,\u00a0\u662f\u70ba\u9952\u76ca\u6a02).<\/p>\n If the disciples are not respectful and do not act accordingly, do not become established in knowledge, their minds do not incline toward the Dharma and follow the Dharma, they do not accept the right Dharma, they disregard the Blessed One\u2019s instruction and are unable to attain certainty in it, then the Blessed One is not sad or sorrowful because of this. Instead, the Blessed One is equanimous and unaffected, constantly mindful and constantly knowing. This is reckoned his first establishment of mindfulness \u2026<\/p>\n (M\u0100 163:\u00a0\u82e5\u5f7c\u5f1f\u5b50\u800c\u4e0d\u606d\u656c,\u00a0\u4ea6\u4e0d\u9806\u884c,\u00a0\u4e0d\u7acb\u65bc\u667a,\u00a0\u5176\u5fc3\u4e0d\u8da3\u5411\u6cd5,\u00a0\u6b21\u6cd5,\u00a0\u4e0d\u53d7\u6b63\u6cd5,\u00a0\u9055\u4e16\u5c0a\u6559,\u00a0\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u5b9a\u8005,\u00a0\u4e16\u5c0a\u4e0d\u4ee5\u6b64\u70ba\u6182\u617c\u4e5f,\u00a0\u4f46\u4e16\u5c0a\u6368\u7121\u6240\u70ba,\u00a0\u5e38\u5ff5,\u00a0\u5e38\u667a.\u00a0\u662f\u8b02\u7b2c\u4e00\u610f\u6b62).<\/p>\n If the disciples are respectful and act accordingly, become established in knowledge, their minds surrender and incline toward the Dharma and follow the Dharma, they accept and uphold the right Dharma, they do not disregard the Blessed One\u2019s instruction and are able to attain certainty in it,\u00a0then the Blessed One is not glad or joyful because of this. Instead, the Blessed One is equanimous and unaffected, constantly mindful and constantly knowing. This is reckoned his second establishment of mindfulness \u2026<\/p>\n (M\u0100 163:\u00a0\u82e5\u5f7c\u5f1f\u5b50\u606d\u656c\u9806\u884c\u800c\u7acb\u65bc\u667a,\u00a0\u5176\u5fc3\u6b78\u8da3\u5411\u6cd5,\u00a0\u6b21\u6cd5,\u00a0\u53d7\u6301\u6b63\u6cd5,\u00a0\u4e0d\u9055\u4e16\u5c0a\u6559,\u00a0\u80fd\u5f97\u5b9a\u8005,\u00a0\u4e16\u5c0a\u4e0d\u4ee5\u6b64\u70ba\u6b61\u559c\u4e5f,\u00a0\u4f46\u4e16\u5c0a\u6368\u7121\u6240\u70ba,\u00a0\u5e38\u5ff5,\u00a0\u5e38\u667a.\u00a0\u662f\u8b02\u7b2c\u4e8c\u610f\u6b62).<\/p>\n [If] some disciples are not respectful and do not act accordingly, do not become established in knowledge, their minds do not incline toward the Dharma and follow the Dharma, they do not accept the right Dharma, they disregard the Blessed One\u2019s instruction and are unable to attain certainty in it; and some disciples are respectful and act accordingly, they become established in knowledge, their minds surrender and incline toward the Dharma and follow the Dharma, they accept and uphold the right Dharma, they do not disregard the Blessed One\u2019s instruction and are able to attain certainty in it, then the Blessed One is not sad or sorrowful and also not glad or joyful because of this. Instead, the Blessed One is equanimous and unaffected, constantly mindful and constantly knowing. This is reckoned his third establishment of mindfulness \u2026<\/p>\n (M\u0100 163:\u00a0\u6216\u6709\u5f1f\u5b50\u800c\u4e0d\u606d\u656c,\u00a0\u4ea6\u4e0d\u9806\u884c,\u00a0\u4e0d\u7acb\u65bc\u667a,\u00a0\u5176\u5fc3\u4e0d\u8da3\u5411\u6cd5,\u00a0\u6b21\u6cd5,\u00a0\u4e0d\u53d7\u6b63\u6cd5,\u00a0\u9055\u4e16\u5c0a\u6559,\u00a0\u4e0d\u80fd\u5f97\u5b9a\u8005;\u00a0\u6216\u6709\u5f1f\u5b50\u606d\u656c\u9806\u884c\u800c\u7acb\u65bc\u667a,\u00a0\u5176\u5fc3\u6b78\u8da3\u5411\u6cd5,\u00a0\u6b21\u6cd5,\u00a0\u53d7\u6301\u6b63\u6cd5,\u00a0\u4e0d\u9055\u4e16\u5c0a\u6559,\u00a0\u80fd\u5f97\u5b9a\u8005,\u00a0\u4e16\u5c0a\u4e0d\u4ee5\u6b64\u70ba\u6182\u617c,\u00a0\u4ea6\u4e0d\u6b61\u559c,\u00a0\u4f46\u4e16\u5c0a\u6368\u7121\u6240\u70ba,\u00a0\u5e38\u5ff5,\u00a0\u5e38\u667a.\u00a0\u662f\u8b02\u7b2c\u4e09\u610f\u6b62).<\/p>\n This description thus presents three establishments of mindfulness, differing from the standard reference to four establishments of mindfulness in other discourses. Regarding the modality of mindfulness in these three cases, Lin (2019, p. 342) argued:<\/p>\n in the case of the three\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>s, it would be reasonable to regard the immediate objects of contemplation as the Buddha\u2019s own mental states, e.g., the absence or presence of satisfaction, and to understand that the Buddha as a teacher is constantly aware of his own mental states and not disturbed by external circumstances. Thus, I suggest that this\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>\u00a0is a special case of the contemplation of one\u2019s own mind (citta<\/em>).<\/p>\n No doubt, the passage implies that the Buddha was mindful of his own mental condition, otherwise he would hardly have been able to describe his equanimity (or satisfaction in the P\u0101li version). At the same time, however, for him to be able to describe the attitude of his disciples, he would have to have been aware of that as well. Given that his equanimous attitude remains the same but the attitudes of the disciples differ, the rationale for the count of\u00a0three\u00a0<\/em>establishments of mindfulness must reflect the\u00a0three\u00a0<\/em>different types of audience.<\/p>\n It follows that the key point of this description is indeed mindful recognition of the mental attitude of others, be it through telepathic abilities or otherwise. In other words, in addition to the explicit indication in the\u00a0Janavasabha-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its\u00a0D\u012brgha-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel (absent from a third parallel), the present passage unambiguously considers awareness of the attitude of others to be an establishment of mindfulness.<\/p>\n The same type of interpretation would also suit a description in the\u00a0S\u0101mag\u0101ma-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its parallels, which is concerned with the relationship between the arising of a litigation among the monastic community and mental states such as anger, envy, deceit, etc. (An\u0101layo\u00a02011, table 11.4). The\u00a0S\u0101mag\u0101ma-sutta\u00a0<\/em>describes what should be done if monastics \u201cwere to observe such a root of litigation internally or externally\u201d (MN 104:\u00a0evar\u016bpa\u00f1 ce \u2026 viv\u0101dam\u016bla\u1e43\u00a0<\/em>ajjhatta\u1e43 v\u0101 bahiddh\u0101 v\u0101 samanupasseyy\u0101tha<\/em>). Roots of litigation like anger, etc., are clearly \u201cmental states\u201d (citta<\/em>). These should be \u201cobserved\u201d (sam +anupassati<\/em>) internally or externally, a description that can conveniently be related to the term\u00a0anupassin\u00a0<\/em>(from the same verb\u00a0anupassati<\/em>) employed in the\u00a0Satipa<\/em>\u1e6d\u1e6d<\/em>h<\/em>\u0101<\/em>na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>(MN 10) to describe \u201ccontemplating\u201d mental states internally or externally. In fact, the\u00a0Madhyama-<\/em>\u0101<\/em>gama\u00a0<\/em>parallel to the\u00a0S\u0101mag\u0101ma-sutta\u00a0<\/em>explicitly brings in right mindfulness in this context (M\u0100\u00a0196:\u00a0\u5982\u662f\u9b2a\u8acd, \u6c5d\u65bc\u5167\u5916\u898b\u800c\u4e0d\u76e1\u8005\u00a0\u2026\u00a0\u6b63\u5ff5\u6b63\u667a). This makes it reasonable to propose that the task described here can be considered a specific implementation of the third\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>\u00a0of contemplation of the mind.<\/p>\n From a practical viewpoint,\u00a0the\u00a0passage in the\u00a0S\u0101mag\u0101ma-sutta\u00a0<\/em>is probably best understood along the lines of what emerged from the three\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>s cultivated by the Buddha, in the sense that here \u201cexternal\u201d refers to the mental states of others. An interpretation based on distinguishing between being subjective and objective (or between the senses and their objects) fails to provide a meaningful reading of this passage. Instead, the task is to recognize if anger, envy, deceit, etc., are present in one\u2019s own mind (or among those who belong to one\u2019s own faction) or else in the minds of members of the opposing faction.<\/p>\n According to Lin (2019, p. 317), directing mindfulness to the mental state of another would either require telepathy or else, if it were to rely on drawing inferences, then this would conflict with the impression \u201cthat the practice of contemplation appears to be rooted in basic, direct experience.\u201d The idea that mindfulness practice should invariably involve some form of direct experience does not fully reflect the range of practices described in the\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its parallels. This can be seen particularly well in the following modality of contemplation of the body, an exercise covered in all three versions:<\/p>\n As though one were to see a corpse thrown away in a charnel ground \u2026 one compares this same body with it: \u2018This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.\u2019<\/p>\n (MN 10:\u00a0seyyath\u0101 pi passeyya sar\u012bra\u1e43 sivathik\u0101ya cha\u1e0d\u1e0dita\u1e43 \u2026 so imam eva k\u0101ya\u1e43 upasa\u1e43harati: ayam pi kho k\u0101yo eva\u1e43dhammo eva\u1e43bh\u0101v\u012b eta\u1e43 anat\u012bto ti<\/em>).<\/p>\n One contemplates another\u2019s corpse \u2026 having seen it, one compares oneself to it: \u2018This body of mine now is also like this, it is of the same nature, and in the end cannot escape [this fate].\u2019<\/p>\n (M\u0100 98:\u00a0\u89c0\u5f7c\u6b7b\u5c4d\u00a0\u2026\u00a0\u898b\u5df2\u81ea\u6bd4:\u00a0\u4eca\u6211\u6b64\u8eab\u4ea6\u5fa9\u5982\u662f,\u00a0\u4ff1\u6709\u6b64\u6cd5,\u00a0\u7d42\u4e0d\u5f97\u96e2).<\/p>\n One contemplates a corpse \u2026 one contemplates that one\u2019s own body is not different from that: \u2018My body will not escape from this calamity.\u2019<\/p>\n (E\u0100 12.1:\u00a0\u89c0\u6b7b\u5c4d\u00a0\u2026\u00a0\u81ea\u89c0\u8eab\u8207\u5f7c\u7121\u7570:\u00a0\u543e\u8eab\u4e0d\u514d\u6b64\u60a3).<\/p>\n The contemplation of the body described here is indubitably a matter of seeing the body of another, rather than having some direct experience of one\u2019s own body. Based on such a vision, this mindfulness practice then requires drawing an inference, namely that one\u2019s own body will similarly become a corpse in the future. Lin (2019, p. 325) is clearly aware of this type of exercise, whose instructions show that the cultivation of mindfulness need not invariably be a matter of direct experience and instead can rely on inference.<\/p>\n Given this precedent, found in\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and both of its parallels, the idea of relying on inferences in order to contemplate the mental state of another need not be seen as problematic in itself. Body language, facial expression, and tone of voice are obvious markers that can be relied on to draw such inferences. The same applies to the situation described in the\u00a0S\u0101mag\u0101ma-sutta\u00a0<\/em>and its parallels, where behavior and ways of speech exhibited in a situation prone to lead to litigation can reveal the presence of anger, envy, deceit, etc., which can be recognized even by those unable to avail themselves of telepathic abilities.<\/p>\n In sum, the interesting suggestion to understand external mindfulness to involve an objective as distinct from a subjective perspective does not seem to yield a commendable form of practice from the viewpoint of early Buddhist meditation theory and also fails to do justice to the sources. In addition, the perceived problem of needing to achieve some form of direct experience through external mindfulness can be set aside as an unwarranted assumption, a reflection of Buddhist modernism rather than of early Buddhist thought.<\/p>\n Adopting the perspective that mindfulness can be employed to ascertain the mental condition of others has the potential of leading to a broadening of perspective in contemporary research. It enables more closely relating mindfulness to the cultivation of prosocial attitudes and improved abilities in social interaction. It can also help in fostering recognition of unconscious biases, whose acting out can more easily be detected if their impact on others is noted with mindfulness. A case in point is racial prejudice, where the cultivation of external mindfulness could make a substantial contribution to countering the pervasive harm caused by systemic racism (An\u0101layo 2020a). In any of these cases, a basic requirement remains a conscious broadening of the range of applicability of mindfulness from what is internal to what is external, a broadening that can eventually culminate in a seamless interrelation of the two as both internal and external.<\/p>\n Compliance with Ethical Standards<\/strong><\/p>\n Ethical Approval: This article does not contain any studies performed by the author with human participants or animals.<\/p>\n Conflict of Interest: The author declares there is no conflict of interest.<\/p>\n Abbreviations<\/strong><\/p>\n DN,\u00a0D\u012bgha-nik\u0101ya<\/em>, E\u0100,\u00a0Ekottarika-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>(T 125); M\u0100,\u00a0Madhyama-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>(T 26); MN,\u00a0Majjhima-nik\u0101ya<\/em>; S\u0100,\u00a0Sa\u1e43yukta-\u0101gama\u00a0<\/em>(T 99); SN,\u00a0Sa\u1e43yutta-nik\u0101ya<\/em>; T, Taish\u014d edition.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong>References<\/strong><\/p>\n An\u0101layo, Bh. (2011).\u00a0A comparative study of the Majjhima-nik\u0101ya<\/em>. Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing Corporation.<\/p>\n An\u0101layo, Bh. (2013).\u00a0Perspectives on satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na<\/em>. Cambridge: Windhorse Publications.<\/p>\n An\u0101layo, Bh. (2020a). Confronting racism with mindfulness.\u00a0Mindfulness, 11<\/em>, doi: 10.1007\/s12671-020-01432-4.<\/p>\n An\u0101layo, Bh. (2020b). External mindfulness.\u00a0Mindfulness, 11<\/em>, 1632\u20131646, doi: 10.1007\/s12671-020-01377-8.<\/p>\n An\u0101layo, Bh. (2020c).\u00a0Mindfulness in early Buddhism, characteristics and functions<\/em>. Cambridge: Windhorse Publications.<\/p>\n Bodhi, Bh. (2000).\u00a0The connected discourses of the Buddha, a new translation of the Sa\u1e43yutta Nik\u0101ya<\/em>. Boston: Wisdom Publications.<\/p>\n Hecker, H. (1992\/2003).\u00a0Die Reden des Buddha, gruppierte Sammlung, Sa\u1e43yutta-nik\u0101ya, aus dem P\u0101li Kanon \u00fcbersetzt: Buch IV, Sa\u1e37\u0101yatana-vagga, Buch des sechsfachen Gebietes<\/em>. Herrnschrot: Beyerlein Steinschulte.<\/p>\n Horner, I. B. (1967).\u00a0The collection of the middle length sayings (Majjhima-nik\u0101ya), vol. I, the first fifty discourses<\/em>. London: Luzac & Company.<\/p>\n Kuan, T.-F. (2008).\u00a0Mindfulness in early Buddhism, new approaches through psychology and textual analysis of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit sources<\/em>. London: Routledge.<\/p>\n Lin Q. (2019). How to contemplate \u2018internally\u2019 and \u2018externally\u2019 in the satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na meditation: a philological investigation.\u00a0Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies<\/em>,\u00a042<\/em>, 315\u2013360, doi: 10.2143\/JIABS.42.0.3287482 .<\/p>\n \u00d1\u0101\u1e47amoli, Bh. (1995\/2005).\u00a0The middle length discourses of the Buddha, a translation of the Majjhima Nik\u0101ya<\/em>. Boston: Wisdom Publications.<\/p>\n Nattier, J. (2007). \u2018One vehicle\u2019 (\u4e00\u4e58) in the Chinese \u0100gamas: new light on an old problem in P\u0101li.\u00a0Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University<\/em>,\u00a010<\/em>, 181\u2013200.<\/p>\n Neuman, K. E. (1912\/2004).\u00a0Die Reden des Buddha, l\u00e4ngere Sammlung, aus dem P\u0101li-Kanon \u00fcbersetzt<\/em>. Herrnschrot: Beyerlein Steinschulte.<\/p>\n Nyanaponika, Th. (1962).\u00a0Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na, the heart of Buddhist meditation, a handbook of mental training based on the Buddha\u2019s way of mindfulness<\/em>. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.<\/p>\n Rhys Davids, T.W. & Rhys Davids, C A. F. (1910).\u00a0Dialogues of the Buddha, translated from the Pali of the D\u012bgha Nik\u0101ya<\/em>,\u00a0part II<\/em>. London: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n Soma, Th. (1941\/1981).\u00a0The way of mindfulness, the Satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na-sutta commentary<\/em>. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.<\/p>\n Walshe, M. (1987).\u00a0Thus have I heard; the long discourses of the Buddha<\/em>. London: Wisdom Publications.<\/p>\n Woodward, F. L. (1930\/1979).\u00a0The book of the kindred sayings (Sa\u1e43yutta-Nik\u0101ya) or grouped suttas<\/em>,\u00a0part V<\/em>. London: Pali Text Society.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" By Bhikkhu An\u0101layo Key words: External Mindfulness; Prosocial Dimensions of Mindfulness;\u00a0satipa\u1e6d\u1e6dh\u0101na;\u00a0sm\u1e5btyupasth\u0101na; Subjective and Objective Abstract The proposal to understand an external application of mindfulness to refer to being objective rather than subjective is not well supported by the relevant sources and fails to be directly applicable to actual meditation practice. The most commonly accepted understanding […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"issue":[],"class_list":["post-15888","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"Abstract<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Introduction<\/strong><\/h5>\n
A New Perspective?<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Subjective and Objective<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Practical Application<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Promoting Identification?<\/strong><\/h5>\n
The Senses and Their Objects<\/strong><\/h5>\n
External Mindfulness in the Early Discourses<\/strong><\/h5>\n
The Three Establishments of Mindfulness<\/strong><\/h5>\n
Direct Experience<\/strong><\/h5>\n
The Potential of External Mindfulness<\/strong><\/h5>\n